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RECENT CASES

COMMERCIAL LAW-CONVERSION LIABILITY OF

COLLECTING BANK TO PAYEE OF A NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT AND THE DEFENSE OF UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 3-419(3)
Cooper v. Union Bank1
Bernice Ruff had financial difficulties as a result of gambling debts.
In 1963 she retained the services of an attorney, Joseph Stell, to represent her in litigation brought by her creditors. Not long thereafter Mr.
Stell employed Miss Ruff as his secretary and bookkeeper. Between December 14, 1965, and February 20, 1967, Miss Ruff took 29 checks intended for her employer and forged the necessary endorsements. She cashed
some of the checks and deposited the others in her own account. She
withdrew all funds prior to the discovery of the forgeries. 2 Stell and his
partners brought an action for conversion against the collecting and
the payor banks. 3 The California Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment
for defendants, 4 concluding that Uniform Commercial Code section
3419(3)5 provides a complete defense for both collecting and payor
banks so long as they act reasonably and in good faith.6 The Supreme
Court of California affirmed the nonliability of the payor banks7 and

1. 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
2. Miss Ruff pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery.
3. A drawee/payor bank is the bank upon which the check is written. A
collecting bank is any bank that handles the instrument prior to its receipt by the
payor bank. UNIFORM COAMERClAL CODE § 4-105.
4. Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 351, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1972).
5. UNIFORM COMmERcIAL CODE § 3-419 (3) provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements
a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in
good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards
applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrumentliable
or its
of to
onethewho
not beyond
the true
is
not
in proceeds
conversiononorbehalf
otherwise
truewas
owner
theowner
amount
hands.
his
in
of any proceeds remaining
The word
"Code" is substituted for the word "Act" in the California statute.
6. Transferees of instruments with forged indorsements cannot claim to be
holders
in due course. Whaley, Forgery and the Holder in Due Course: The Commercial
Puzzle,disagreed
78 CoM. with
L.J. 277
7. Paper
The court
the (1973).
lower court on the applicability of the
defense of section 3-419 (3) to payor banks. The supreme court found that the
payor banks were not liable because the suit against the collecting banks operated
as a ratification of the payment by

the payor banks. In the three instances where
there was no ratification the payor bank was allowed to utilize the defense of
section
which
Any3-406,
person
whoprovides:
by his negligence substantially contributes . . . to the
making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the

alteration or lack of authority

..

against a drawee or other payor who

pays the instrument in good faith andin accordance with the
i
easonable commercial standards of the draweens or payor's business (empha-

sis added).
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the collecting banks for all instruments received after April 1, 1966;8 however, the court reversed the lower courts and held the collecting banks
liable for checks handled before that date. The reversal rested upon an
interpretation of Uniform Comercial Code section 3-419(3).
Two reasons were given for holding that section 3-419 (3) does not
limit the liability of collecting and depositary banks. First, the banks
had the proceeds. Under bank collection theory, when the payor bank
transmits funds to the collecting bank in return for the forged instrument,
it is transmitting its own funds. A suit for conversion against the collecting
bank ratifies this transfer, so that the collecting bank holds the proceeds
in a constructive trust for the payee. Because the payee has not ratified
the transfer of funds to the forger, the money given to the forger is the
bank's. The second reason for avoiding the defense was that the legis-

lature did not intend to change pre-Code law holding collecting and depositary banks liable to the payee.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, a majority
of jurisdictions, including California and Missouri, held a collecting bank
liable to the payee if the bank took a check upon an unauthorized endorsement.9 Sometimes this liability was for conversion,' 0 sometimes assumpsit.11 A recent case said collecting banks are liable, but the theory
behind the liability is unimportant.' 2
The Uniform Commercial Code followed pre-Code law in holding a
collecting and depositary bank liable to the payee for conversion if it pays
a check which has not been validly endorsed. 13 However, section 3-419 (3)
8. The court relied on section 3-404 and the accompanying official comments.
Section 3-404 (1). Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as
that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it ....
(emphasis added).
Comment 4. The words "or is precluded from denying it" are . . . to

recognize the negligence which precludes a denial of the signature.
This is a novel use of this section, and is discussed in 5 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 319,
333-35 (1974). But cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Bank, 431 F.2d 341,
344 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Florida law) (defense of contributory negligence is
not available in an action for conversion).
9. See cases collected in Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1965).
10. Kansas City Cas. Co. v. Wesport Ave. Bank, 191 Mo. App. 287, 177 S.W.
1092 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
11. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v. South Side Bank, 224 Mo.

App. 876, 27 S.W.2d 768 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930); Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Tr. Co.,
263 S.W. 1038 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924).

12. Chemical Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Say. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo.
En Banc 1966) (dictum).
13. UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 3419 (1) (c). An instrument is converted

when it is paid on a forged indorsement. Stone 9- Webster Eng. Corp. v. First
Nat. Bank, 345 Mass. 1, 6, 184 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1962); Belmar Trucking Corp. v.
American Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 31, 34, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247, 251 (Civ. Ct. 1970).

See Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 932, § 34 (c).
Although subsection

(1) (c) says "forged indorsements," courts have inter-

preted this to include unauthorized indorsements. R. ANDERSON, 2 ANDERSON ON
THM UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1034 (2d ed. 1971). An unauthorized signature
includes a forgery. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (43).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/14
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seemingly limits this liability14 to the remaining funds if the bank acts
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. 15
The prevailing rule prior to Cooper was that a collecting bank's liability
17
to the true owner 16 was reduced by whatever amounts were paid out.
However, only one reported case1 s has used section 3-419 (3) to deny relief to a payee. One well-known work attributes this paucity to deliberate
manipulation by the courts. 19 The most common method is to find that
the bank did not act in a reasonable commercial manner, 20 although sometimes courts simply ignore the section. 2 ' One court found that the bank
was not a representative 22 in the ordinary check handling situation. The
state of the law prior to Cooper was that a collecting bank's liability
could be limited if the requirements of section 3-419 (3) were met-but
the courts rarely found that they were.
The defendant collecting and depositary banks in Cooper asserted
nonliability to the payee under section 3-419 (3)-i.e., no proceeds remaining in their hands. The lower courts sustained this defense, but the California Supreme Court, after redefining proceeds,2 3 found that they
retained the proceeds and thus were liable to the plaintiff. Cooper is a reversal of prior understanding, but not case law, 24 of the meaning of "pro14. A collecting bank may be liable to other banks under sections 3-417 and
4-207 even if no proceeds remain; but the payee cannot recover directly against
the collecting bank under these warranty sections. See text accompanying notes
53-61 infra.
15. Forman v. First Nat. Bank, 320 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (dictum).
16. Section 3-419 speaks of the "true owner" of an instrument, rather than
the payee, but for the purposes of this note, the terms are assumed to be synonomous.
17. "To the extent it pays cash over the counter to the thief it has no proceeds." J. WHrr.E & R. Sunrrims, UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE 502 (1972) (hereinafter cited as WHrE &:SiMMEms).

"Hence, a collecting bank which has remitted the proceeds of a check which
has a forged indorsement would not be liable to the owner...." Murray, Ne-

gotiableInstruments, 20 U. MIain L.R. 225, 237 (1965).
18. Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So. 2d 553 (Fla. App. 1972).
19. So much for the work of the Code draftsmen. Thereafter, the courts
have taken up section 3-419 (3), and what they have done to it shouldn't
happen to a dog. The courts have ingeniously evaded the restrictions in
3-419(3)....
W-rrE & SumsmEs, supra note 17, at 504.

20. Hermetic Refrig. Co. v. Central Valley Nat. Bank, 493 F.2d 476 (1974);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat. Bank, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970);
Belmar Trucking Corp. v. American Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 31, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247
(Civ. Ct. 1970); Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246
A.2d 162 (1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (1969).
21. Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank, 253 Cal. App.
2d 368, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967).
22. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 84 Dauph.
280 (C.P. 1965). Cooper also came to this conclusion.
23. The Cooper definition of proceeds is criticized in Note, 74
104 (1974); Note, 5 RuTGERs-CAMDEN L.J. 319 (1974).

COLUm.

L. REv.

24. The only other case that has discussed the nature of "proceeds", Ervin
v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 84 Dauph. 280 (C.P. 1965),
came to the same conclusion as Cooper, namely, when a depositary bank releases
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ceeds" as used in section 3-419 (8). The effect of its definition of "proceeds"
is that no matter how much the depositary bank gives to the forger,
the bank will still have all of the proceeds remaining in its hands.
The Cooper court began its analysis by asking two questions: "first,
did [the depositary banks] receive any proceeds and second, have they
parted with any proceeds they may have received? ' 2 5 In answer to the
first, the suit brought by the payee against the depositary bank ratified
the collection of the proceeds from the payor bank; therefore, the defendant collecting banks did receive the proceeds. This answer is not controversial and is well-supported in case law. But the answer to the second question, the finding that the bank retained the proceeds even
after releasing to the forger amounts equal to the proceeds, was not so
obvious.
In support of its holding that the depositary bank gave its own funds
to the forger while retaining the proceeds, Cooper makes several points.
There is the general point that ratification of the collection is not a
ratification of delivery to the wrong person. And in the case of an instrument cashed over the counter,2 6 the bank must be giving its own
money because it has not yet collected the proceeds. As for an instrument
deposited, the court relies on the doctrine of constructive trusts. The court
said that agency ceases after the collection process is completed and the
bank becomes a debtor to the true owner. The money collected is mingled
with the bank's funds and thus the money received by the forger is the
bank's money, while the bank holds the proceeds of the collected in21
strument in a constructive trust for the true owner.
The court's reasoning is open to criticism in several respects. First,
the court assumes that "proceeds" is a word of art, with a highly technical meaning. The absence of any Code definition 28 would seem to
negate this inference and suggest an ordinary meaning for the word. An
ordinary understanding would be that once the depositary bank gives
value for the instrument and is in turn given value for the instrument by
the payor bank, it has parted with the proceeds. Second, even assuming
that "proceeds" has a technical meaning in the bank collection situation,
funds to a forger, it is giving away its own money, while the proceeds collected
from the payor bank are held for the true owner. See also United States v.
Collins, 464 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (no conversion since the bank paid its own
money on a draft with a forged indorsement).
25. 9 Cal. 3d at 376, 507 P.2d at 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
26. Some commentators have suggested that a bank is not a representative
when it cashes a check (and therefore purchases the instrument with its own
funds), but is when it accepts it for deposit. Farnsworth and Leary, UCC Brief No.
10: Forgery and Alteration of Checks, 14 PRAc. LAw. 75, 79 (March, 1968). Eroin
rejected such a distinction. 38 D. g C.2d at 478, 84 Dauph. at 283, as did Cooper.
9 Cal. 3d at 380, 507 P.2d at 616, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 8. This rejection is criticized in
Note, 74 CoTJum. L. REv. 104 (1974).
27. 9 Cal. 3d at 379, 507 P.2d at 615, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
28. "Proceeds" are not defined in Articles 3 or 4. The definition given in
section 9-306 (1) does not apply.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/14
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the court's definition is questionable statutory construction because it is
apparently irreconcilable with the language of section 3-419 (3). That sub-

section says liability for conversion is limited to the amount of proceeds
remaining in the bank's hands; a clear implication that it is possible for
no proceeds to remain in the bank's hands. Yet, under the Cooper definition, it is practically impossible for the depositary bank not to have the
proceeds remaining in its hands.2 9 A final criticism of the court's "proceeds" argument is the lack of authority for its application of the constructive trust theory to the Code and to the forged endorsement situation.3 0
On balance, whether Cooper's definition of proceeds is correct is a
close question. On the one hand, it is supported by the only other court
to face the issue 31 and by the many pre-Code cases saying the proceeds
are held in trust for the true owner.32 On the other hand, the Cooper
definition makes section 3-419 (3) a nullity, which violates one of the first
principles of statutory construction, namely, that a statute should be construed so as to give meaning to every part. The answer would seem to lie
with the intent of the drafters and the legislators.
The California Supreme Court found no intent on the part of
either draftsmen or the legislature to change the pre-Code law that collecting and depositary banks are liable to the true owner for conversion if they
take an instrument with a forged endorsement.3 3 The court placed significance on the fact that section 3-419 (3) uses the ambiguous word "proceeds" instead of expressly absolving collecting and depositary banks if
they gave "value" for the instrument. The court went on to say that
neither the draftsmen nor the legislature had any reason for making direct
suits against the collecting and depositary banks more difficult, because
these banks will ultimately be liable anyway,3 4 and that requiring uneconomical circuity of action violates the purposes of the Code and creates
'.a significant potential for injustice."3 5 Furthermore, the court pointed
29. The only time the bank will not have the full proceeds is when cash
on hand goes below the face amount of the instrument.
30. The court relied on 5 R. ScoTr, ScoTr

ON

TRUSTS § 540 (3d ed. 1967) and

Jennings v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216 (1935). An examination of Scott reveals that the treatise is concerned with the claims of depositors, creditors, etc., against a bank that has failed, not instruments collected
upon a forged indorsement. Likewise, Jennings involved a bank failure and not a
forged indorsement situation.
31. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C. 2d 473, 84 Dauph.
280 (C.P. 1965).
32. Some pre-Code Missouri cases used the word "proceeds" in a similiar
way as used in Cooper. See Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Tr. Co., 263 S.W. 1038
(St. L. Mo. App. 1924); Aetna Cas. &cSurety Co. v. Lindell Tract Co., 348 S.W.2d
558 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Chemical Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Say. Bank,
411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. En Banc 1966). See also United States Fidelity &Guar. Co. v.
Fidelity Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 232 Mo. App. 412, 109 S.W.2d 47 (K.C. Ct. App.
1937).
33. This is criticized in Note, 23 CATHOLIC U.L.R.v. 163 (1973).
34. UNIFoP ComumFaRcuAL CODE §§ 4-207, 3-417.
35. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 506 P.2d at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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out that the comments to section 3-419 (3) do not indicate any change in
the law.36 And finally, the court found that section 3-419 (3) was not meant
to apply to the ordinary bank collection transaction, 7 because all of the
illustrations and cases cited in the comments deal with the situation where
an innocent broker sells stolen securities for his principal.
Criticism of the Cooper divination of legislative intent can focus

on two areas; the weakness of the evidence supporting the "no-change"
contention, and other evidence strongly suggesting that a change was
meant.
To begin with, the court said the Code should and could have said
"for value" instead of the ambiguous word "proceeds" if collecting and
depositary banks are to be exonerated when they release funds to the
forger. This assumes that "proceeds" is an ambiguous term. Prior to
Cooper, however, there was no difficulty in understanding what "proceeds"
meant. Even if "proceeds" is an ambiguous term, no special significance
should be placed on bad draftsmanship.
The court also said there is no reason why the Code should present
impediments to direct suit by the payee against collecting and depositary
banks; therefore, there are no impediments. This argument overlooks the
background against which the Code was drafted. Although most states allowed a payee to sue any bank which handled the instrument, a substantial number of states did not allow the payee to sue the drawee bank88
and a few other states did not allow him to recover from collecting
banks.3 9 The Code does not explain why it was drafted in this way, but
possibly there was a compromise on the issue. The draftsmen might have
been influenced by the civil law. 40 At a more basic level, the interests of
the banks might have influenced the draftsmen. 4' The point is, there might
have been many reasons why the Code modified the pre-Code rule.
Evidence of the function of section 3-419 (3) as a defense is found in
Official Comment 6,42 which explicitly forsees that a collecting bank will
36. The court characterizes Official Comment 5 as saying that section 3-419 (3)
is a codification of prior case law and California Comment 5 as saying the section
is consistent with prior California law.
37. Accord, Comment, 45 U. COLO. L. Rav. 281 (1974); Note, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 715 (1974).
38. California Code Comment 3 to § 3-419.
39. Soderlin v. Marquette Nat. Bank, 214 Minn. 408, 8 N.W.2d 331 (1943).
This is still true in Louisiana. Smith v. Louisiana Bank 8: Trust Co., 255 So.2d 816
(La. App. 1971).
40. For a comparison of Anglo-American and Continental law, see Kessler,
Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938).
41. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YAL.E L.J. 334 (1954); Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62
YAIm L.J. 417, 469 (1953); WHITE & SUmmERs, supra note 17, at 505 n.18.
42. Official Comment 6 reads:
Thus a collecting bank might be liable to a drawee bank which had been
subject to liability under this section, even though the collecting bank
might not be liable directly to the owner of the instrument.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/14
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not always be liable to the payee, even though it will be liable, to the
drawee bank. This comment seems inconsistent with the Cooper definition
of proceeds under which the collecting bank will always be liable to the
true owner.

The court saw another indication that no change was intended in
California Code Comment 5, which says section 3-419 (3) is consistent with
prior California law. 43 But a reading of the full text of the comment erodes

the comment's credibility, because it incorrectly summarizes the Code and
prior California law as allowing good faith as a complete defense to conversion. 44 The court went on to find support in Official Comment 545 by
characterizing it as saying that section 3-419 (3) is "merely a codification
of prior decisions," 46 and since the prior decisions referred to are cases
of an investment broker selling stolen securities, section 3-419 (3) does not
refer to the bank collection situation. But the comment does not say
the section is a codification of prior case law. Rather, it says subsection
(3) adopts the rule of decisions which limit a good faith representative's
liability to the proceeds remaining in his hands. If the "decisions" referred to are investment broker cases which held an agent not liable after
he turned the proceeds over to his principal, then it may be significant
that the comment says "adopt the rule," rather than "adopt the decisions."
Apparently, the draftsmen intended to extend the rule to the bank collection situation, because section 3-419 (3) defines a representative as including depositary and collecting banks. An even more compelling argument that Cooper is wrong in limiting section 3-419 (3) to the investment
broker situation is that investment securities 47 and the liability of brokers4s
thereon are covered by Article 8 of the Code and not Article 3. 49
The intent of the draftsmen to provide a defense to collecting and
43. California Code Comment 5 reads:
Subdivision (3) is new statutory law. Its basic premise that a person dealing in good faith with the property of another is not liable for conversion
is consistent with prior California law on the tort of conversion.
The Missouri Code Comment reads: "Subsection (3) is new and is self-explanatory."
44. For example, Cooper held the collecting banks liable for conversion, even
though the lower court "concluded that all defendants . . . had acted in good
faith.... ." 9 Cal. 3d at 375-76, 507 P.2d at 613, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
45. Official Comment 5 reads:
Subsection (3), which is new, is intended to adopt the rule of decisions
which has held that a representative, such as a broker or depositary bank,
who deals with a negotiable instrument for his principal in good faith is
not liable to the true owner for conversion of the instrument or otherwise,
except that he may be compelled to turn over to the true owner the
instrument itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his
hands....
46. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 507 P.2d at 617-18, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
47. For a technical definition, see section 8-102.
48. UNIFORm COmmRCIAL CODE § 8-318 provides in part:
An agent . . . who in good faith . . . has received securities and sold,
pledged, or delivered them according to the instructions of his principal
is not liable for conversion . . . although the principal has no right to
dispose of them.
49. UNIFoRM Co.rN ERCIAL CODE § 8-102 (b) provides in part: "A writing which
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depositary banks is dear. Official Comment 550 says section 3-419(3) adopts
the rule of those cases which limit a representative's liability. Official
Comment 651 foresees that collecting banks will not be liable to the payee
in some situations, even though the drawee bank will be. The very inclusion of the subdivision in the section on conversion and forged indorsements raises the natural inference that the limitation of liability applies
to collecting and depositary banks which handle instruments containing a
forged indorsement.
Once it becomes evident that the draftsmen intended section 3-419 (3)
as a limitation on conversion liability, the proper definition of "proceeds"
is obvious-the amount forwarded from the payor bank in exchange for
the instrument less the amounts paid out to the forger. The Cooper
definition cannot withstand close scrutiny, because it violates the intent
of the draftsmen and the purpose of subdivision (3).
The bases for the Cooper interpretation of section 3-419 (3) are unsound. The court did not, however, decide the case solely on the basis
of statutory construction; it made a policy choice in favor of payees and
against collecting banks. 2 As a matter of policy, the court may well have
been right. No commentator or court has praised the process whereby the
payee sues the drawe'r, 53 who sues the drawee bank,5 4 who sues the intermediary bank who sues the depositary bank,5 5 whereas several have condemned it.56 Defenders of this circuitous method say it is necessary because the defenses which may not be available in a direct suit by the payee
against the depositary bank are available in the longer route. 7 The weakness of this argument is that most of the defenses spoken of are either
is a security is governed by this article and not by Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper.... UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE §83-103(1): "This Article does not

apply to. . . investment securities."
50. See note 45 supra.

51. See note 42 supra.
52. Apparently the interpretation of the Code as given in Cooper was entirely
the court's own and was made without benefit of arguments and briefs of the
opposing counsels. 5 RuTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 319, 821 n.15 (1974).
58. UNIFORM CoMzramcAr CODE § 3-804. The payee can also sue the drawee.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419(1).
54. See UNIFORM COMmRmCIAL CODE § 4-401.
55. See UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-207,

3-417, describing the warranty

of good title.
56. "[T]he Code unreasonably promotes circuity of action.
"[N]eedless
circuity of action." O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 RuTxnms L. REv. 189, 267 (1969). Comment, Allocation of Losses
from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 YA.x L.J. 417, 471 (1953). Cf. Sales Promotion Executives
Ass'n. v. Schlinger & Weiss, Inc., 234 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Civ. Ct. 1962) (pre-Code):

"There's no need to cross the Mississippi by way of Siberia." Id. at 787.

57. O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23

RTGERrs L. RrEv. 189, 284 (1969). Cf. Dawson Textile Corp. v. Flatbush Check

Cashing Serv., Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 293, 329 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Civ. Ct. 1972); Stone &

Webster Eng. Corp. v. First Nat. Bank, 845 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 858 (1962). However, in Stone the court said: "Cases where the payee has acquired rights in an
instrument may stand on a different footing." Id. at 8, 184 N.E.2d at 363 n.4.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/14
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available only when the drawer is the plaintiff 58 or are as readily available as
a defense 59 by collecting and depositary banks as by any other defendant.6 0
As a practical matter, the drawee banks might be located all across the nation and the expense of bringing suit in a distant forum might be so
great, that the payee would have to bear the loss. The court felt this to be
unjust, and more than one commentator has agreed that the better rule
would be to allow direct suit.61
The Cooper definition of proceeds may be correct under bank collection theory, but it is obvious that the draftsmen of section 3-419 (3) had
a broader definition in mind. The draftsmen intended to limit the conversion liability of collecting and depositary banks, a goal that cannot be
achieved under Cooper. On the other hand, the Code is so complex that
the court may have been correct in asserting that the legislature neither
knew nor intended such a result. And as a matter of fairness and economy,
the Cooper solution is superior to the Code.
v- Other courts will have to face this same problem and should consider
two other relevant factors: uniformity and the true rule. Uniformity is
the reason for the existence of the Uniform Commercial Code.6 2 Although
it would be desirable for all courts to interpret the Code correctly, this
will not happen; California is a precedent setter. Perhaps it would be
better if all jurisdictions uniformly interpreted section 3-419 (3) incorrectly
than to have a "majority rule" and a "minority rule." A second factor to
consider is what could be called a "true rule." Although courts have said
collecting and depositary banks can limit their conversion liability, the
courts almost never allow them to do so. Perhaps it would be better to
emasculate section 3-419 (3) openly than to do so by setting an impossible
standard of reasonableness for banks. These two factors, plus sympathy
for the payee, would lead a court to adopt the Cooper definition of
proceeds.
ROBERT E. YOUNG

The banks prefer the circuitous route because it increases the likelihood of

someone else shouldering the loss. On occasion the collecting bank will escape
liability because the payor bank asserts a successful defense against the drawer
under section 4-406. Other times the collecting bank will be able to defend successfully against the payor bank under sections 4-207 (4) and 4-406 (5). And often
the payor bank will be in such a distant forum that the payee cannot afford to sue.
58. UNIFOnr COMMrFCIAL CODE § 4-406.
59. See, e.g., UNIFORm CosEaCIAL CODE § 1-201 (43) (an unauthorized indorsement means one without actual, implied, or apparent authority); § 3-404 (an
unauthorized signature can be ratified).
60. WHrrE &c Sum1amRs, supra note 17, at 503. For example in Cooper the
collecting banks were in as good a position as anyone to show that the payee had
been negligent, and were able to do so successfully.
61. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 507 P.2d at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9. Funk, The Fate of
the Instrument in the Hands of the U.C.C., 87 BANKING L.J. 502, 507 (1970);
WmT ScSummRms, supra note 17, at 505. Cf. Comment, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 102 (1971).
62. Schnader, Looking Ahead at the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Bus.
LAw. 771, 772 (1964); Schnader, The New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law-The Uniform Commercial Code Marches On, 13 Bus. LAw. 646, 655

(1958).
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